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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
Utah Copper Division, 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 15939 
v. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and BILL BILANZICH, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
I. STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is Plaintiff's Reply Brief to the Brief filed by 
respondents, Bill Bilanzich and the Industrial Commission of 
Utah in the above-entitled Case No. 15939 between Kennecott 
Copper Corporation, Utah Copper Division, plaintiff v. the 
Industrial Commission of Utah and Bill Bilanzich, defendants, an 
original proceeding filed by plaintiff with the Supreme Court of 
Utah for the purpose of having the lawfulness of an Order dated 
May 5, 1978, and finalized on June 19, 1978, by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah inquired into and set aside in its entirety. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential facts pertinent to this controversy were 
not in dispute and were summarized in Plaintiff's Brief hereto-
fore filed in this controversy. However, there are certain 
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facts referred to in Respondent's Brief pertaining to the medical 
care of respondent, Bill Bilanzich, which require clarification. 
record shows clearly that the alleged incident of Mr. Bilanzich 
occurred prior to March 8, 1974 and that he first received treatment 
for his wrist condition on September 23, 1974, from Dr. John A. 
Gubler, a physician retained by plaintiff to handle and treat both 
non-industrial and industrial injuries and illnesses of Kennecott 
employees working at its Bingham Mine operations. Respondent's Brief I 
indicates that the company doctor continued to treat the wrist of 
Mr. Bilanzich until March of 1977. However, the record shows clearly 1 
that after the initial visit to Dr. Gubler in September of 1974, 
Bilanzich did not return for any treatment to Dr. Gubler until the 
middle of 1976 (R42). Indeed, the record shows also lR42l that 
i 
I 
in January of 1975, Mr. Bl~anzich on his own went 
his wrist to orthopedic specialist, Dr. Robert H. 
for treatment of 
Lamb, who examined, I 
I 
cook X-rays and treated the wrist of Mr. Bilanzich. The record is 
clear, of course, and the Administrative Law Judge so found, that no 
compensation benefits of any kind by way of temporary total dis-
ability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits or permanent ' 
partial disability benefits were paid at any time by plaintiff to ~-I 
Bilanzich. The Administrative Law Judge in his Findings of Fact (R98 1 
and 99) acknowledged that no such compensation was paid within the 
three-year period specified by §35-l-99 U.C.A. but then found as a 
rna tter of law that the rendition of medical treatment by the company 
retained physician constitutes the payment of compensation under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act and thus serves to extend the time within 
in which a claim can be filed for workmen's compensation benefits of 
-2-
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all kinds. No authority was cited by the Administrative Law Judge 
for this conclusion of law which was made by the Administrative Law 
'I Judge on his own and which, in the opinion of the plaintiff, flies 
squarely in the face of the unanimous Utah Supreme Court decision in 
Gardner v. Industrial Commission, 30 Ut.2d 377, 517 P.2d 1329 (Dec. 
1973) which clearly excludes the rendering of medical treatment as 
"payment of compensation" within the language or the intent of 
section 35-1-99. Accordingly the plaintiff filed this action with f I 
the Supreme Court and set forth its legal arguments in Plaintiff's 
Brief submitted in connection therewith. Respondent's Brief filed on 
Y I 
behalf of the Industrial Commission of Utah and Bill Bilanzich has 
attempted to distinguish this case from the Gardner decision and in 
addition has raised for the first time the further defense of estop-
I pel as against plaintiff. Plaintiff's Reply Brief is submitted 
I, I herein as plaintiff's response to those contentions found in the 
I Respondent's Brief as above set forth. 
) I III. STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The unanimous Supreme Court decision in the Gardner case 
1s not susceptible to the interpretation or explanation accorded to 
1t in Respondent's Brief and means exactly what is says, i.e. that 
:.I 
the plain clear language of the statute excludes medical treatment 
)81 
from consideration as payment of compensation. 
2. Respondent's contention that plaintiff somehow is estopped 
from asserting the statute of limitations in this controversy is 
~holly untenable. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
n 
POINT I 
-3-
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THE UNANIMOUS SUPREME COURT DECISION IN 
THE GARDNER CASE IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO 
THE INTERPRETATION OR EXPLANATION ACCOR-
DED TO IT IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF AND 
MEANS EXACTLY WHAT IS SAYS, I.E. THAT THE 
PLAIN CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE EX-
CLUDES MEDICAL TREATMENT FROM CONSIDERA-
TION AS PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION 
The Industrial Commission here, as in the Gardner case, has 
attempted to bootstrap the rendition of medical treatment into the 
payment of compensation under the provisions of section 35-1-99 by 
the bold statement that "compensation has been consistently con-
strued to include the payment of medical expenses." (R98) No 
authority is cited for such a construction and there is none. On 
the contrary this identical issue was the sole matter for resolutic:. 
I 
by the Supreme Court in the Gardner case where the Industrial Commis·[ 
sion and the applicant contended, as here, that the three year 
statute mentioned above starts to run from the date of the last 
treatment because the rendition of medical treatment constitutes 
"payment of compensation within the language of the statute." This 
Court, in a unanimous decision, held otherwise, stating that 
"under no construction of its wording can one 
arrive at such conclusion." 
The court in closing referred to the 
"plain clear language of the statute, leaving the 
matter of changing the language to the legis-
lature if it chooses to liberalize, clarify or 
otherwise rewrite it." 
The legislature has not thus far made any changes or amendments to 
the statute and we submit that it is not within the jurisdiction or 
the authority of the Industrial Commission to liberalize or rewritE 
the statute by administrative fiat. 
-4-
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. s·l 
I 
The argument in Respondent's Brief that the payment of the 
medical services not the rendition of the medical services is the 
critical item is equally untenable. That argument was foreclosed as 
early as the Jones case 17 Ut.2d 28 404 P.2d 27 (1965) in which this 
court in another unanimous decision held that the payment for medical 
services was of no significance in the operation of the limitation 
provisions of section 35-l-99 U.C.A. As stated by the court in its 
decision in the Jones case, to hinge the running of the statute of 
limitations upon the date of payment for medical services would 
"emasculate the obvious legislative intent of the statute." The 
Gardner decision, of course, holds that the same is true with respect 
to the date of rendition of the medical services . 
Section 35-l-99 is not the only provision of the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act which recognizes the separate treatment of compensa-
tion vis-a-vis medical expenses. Other important provisions of the 
Act also recognizing this difference are as follows: 
(A) Section 35-1-81. This section provides for the payment of 
medical, hospital and burial expenses, etc. The key language is in 
the beginning of the paragraph as follows: 
"In addition to the compensation provided for in 
this title, the employer ... shall in ordinary 
cases also be required to ~ such reasonable sum 
for mediCal, nurse and hospital services, and for 
medicines, and for such artificial means and ap-
pliances as may be necessary to treat the patient 
Such language, of course, recognizes that medical and hospital ex-
renses, etc. are clearly separate from and 'in addition to' compen-
sation payments. 
-5-
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In Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Anderson, 30 U.2d 102, 514 P.2d 
217 this Court construed the medical expense language of this section 
(35-l-81) and held that the limitation provisions applicable to 
compensation payments could not be expanded to include medical ex-
penses. The following language of the court is significantly appli-
cable to this controversy: 
"It is often said that it should be assumed that 
all of the words used in a statute were used 
advisedly and were intended to be given meaning 
and effect. For the same reasons, the omissions 
should likewise be taken note of and given effect." 
(30 Utah 2d at 105, citing Estate of Barnett 97 
Cal. app. 138, 275 P. 453) (emphasis supplied) 
In ~he same case Justice Crockett referred to different juris-
dictions in addition t: C~a~ i~ which payments for medical care are 
not considered the same as "compensation" for lost wages or disabilit:l 
rating within the meaning of the statute and therefore, not subject t:, 
the limitations prescribed for compensation payments. ( 30 Utah 2d 1021 
at 105) 
(B) Section 35-1-45. 
"Every employee mentioned in §35-1-43 who is in-
jured, and the dependents of every such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of or in 
the course of his employment . . shall be 
entitled to receive, and shall be paid, such 
compensation for loss sustained on account of such 
injury or death and such amount for medical, nurse 
and hospital serVICes and medicines and in the 
case of death such amount of funeral expenses as 
is herein provided." (emphasis supplied) 
Here again is an indication that the employee is to receive 
compensation for loss and, in addition, amounts for medical and 
hospital expenses, etc. 
(C) Section 35-1-69. This section provides as follows: 
-6-
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it I 
(1) "If any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, 
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an indus-
trial injury for which compensation and medical 
care is provided by this title that results in 
permanent incapacity which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not had the 
pre-existing incapacity, compensation and medical 
care, which medical care and other related items 
are outlined in §35-1-81, shall be awarded on the 
basis of the combined injuries but the liability 
of the employer for such compensation and medical 
care shall be for the industrial injury only ... " 
And in the following paragraph in the same section, the statute refers 
to the special medical panel and its allocation of permanent physical 
impairment with the following language: 
"The Industrial Commission shall then assess the 
liability for compensation and medical care to the 
employer on the basis of the percentage of perma-
nent physical impairment attributable to the 
industrial injury only . 
It is clear from the above that medical expenses, etc. are 
considered separate and distinct from compensation payments in many 
.OZI areas of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. This Court, we submit, 
properly has recognized that distinction in both the Gardner and the 
Anderson decisions, pointing out clearly that omissions should be 
taken note of and given effect in interpreting statutes and leaving 
"the question of any desired clarification to the attention of the 
1 legislature". We submit further that had the legislature, either 
originally or following the decision of this Court in the Gardner 
case, intended for either the date of rendition of medical services 
or the date of payment for the same to be the date for triggering the 
running of the statute of limitations in §35-1-99, it could very 
easily have done so with specific language to that effect. To date 
such language has not been forthcoming and we submit, therefore, that 
-7-
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both the language and the intent of the limitation of action require-
ments of that section remain as construed by this court in Gardner 
v. Industrial commission and that the claim for compensation benefits 
of the applicant Bill Bilanzich in this controversy is barred by 
section 35-1-99 because it was not filed within three years from the 
date of the accident or from the date of the last payment of compen-
sation as required by the statute. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFF 
SOMEHOW IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN 
THIS CONTROVERSY IS WHOLLY UNTENABLE. 
It is contended in Respondent's Brief that plaintiff is estopped 
from asserting the s~a~ute 2f limitations because its doctor treated 
the defendant for a.Ln1'JS t tnree years without advising him of the 
extent of his injury or referring him to an orthopedic surgeon until 
almost three years after the date of the accident. Such contention 
is invalid and untenable. In the first place the record shows - and 
the defendant has acknowledged - that he did not see the company 
doctor (Dr. John A. Gubler) about his wrist condition until September 
24, 1974 more than six months after his alleged injury, that he saw 
Dr. Gubler again the following week but did not go in again to see 
Dr. Gubler about his wrist until the middle of 1976 nearly two years 
later (R42). In the meantime defendant on his own went to an ortho-
pedic specialist Dr. Robert A. Lamb in January 1975 (R36) where x-
rays were taken and treatment given to defendant in the form of 
shots. Thus it can hardly be contended that the company doctor 
treated Mr. Bilanzich from 1974 until 1977 without revealing to him 
-8-
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:r 
che nature of his wrist problem. Indeed, it is apparent that Mr. 
Bilanzich sought out and consulted with an orthopedic specialist on 
his own with respect to this wrist problem and that he did not return 
again to the company doctor until almost a year and a half later. 
The record shows also that when defendant complained of further 
difficulties to Dr. Gubler in November of 1976 he was at that time 
referred for additional studies which followed and ultimately resulted 
in the wrist surgery in July of 1977. We submit that two brief 
visits by defendant to the company doctor more than six months after 
the alleged injury, followed by a waiting period of almost two years, 
then a single visit in the middle of 1976 and again in November of 
1976 could hardly be construed as giving rise to a legitimate claim 
of continuous treatment for three years without disclosure of the 
extent of injury and without reference to specialist examination or 
assistance as contended in Respondent's Brief in this case. Indeed, 
it is clear that defendant relied not at all on Dr. Gubler, and 
it is clear also from defendant's own testimony that he, more than 
anyone, was aware of his wrist difficulties but endured his problems 
by himself for almost two years before returning to Dr. Gubler for 
assistance. (R42) Finally, when defendant near the end of November 
of 1976 complained of increased wrist difficulty, Dr. Gubler re-
sponded with electromyographic studies to be taken at Holy Cross 
Hospital and subsequent orthopedic examination and treatment. Under 
such circumstances, we submit that defendant has failed to establish 
any of the requisite elements of estoppel in this case and that 
Plaintiff Kennecott Copper Corporation clearly is not estopped to 
raise the statute of limitations issue, particularly where there was 
-9-
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never an acknowledgement by the plaintiff by way of workmen's com-
pensation payments or otherwise that it considered defendant's wris 
condition to be industrial in nature. There was no misrepresentat~ 
by word or conduct on the part of plaintiff which possibly could ha·. 
misled or lulled defendant into a course of inaction by way of fil~ 
his claim for benefits; nor was there any reliance by the defendant a 
upon any such word or conduct of the plaintiff as required for an p 
estoppel claim of this nature. Indeed it is clear that the defendm t 
did not rely at all upon any words or conduct of the plaintiff, but 
instead he sought and obtained, on his own, examination, treatment 
and advice from an orthopedic specialist for the very condition for 
which he now seeks compensation. To hold that by such minimal conti 
and treatment over a period of almost three years under such eire~· , 
stances as indicated above, plaintiff is now estopped from assertinc c 
its legal rights under the Utah Workman's Compensation Act would in 
effect tend to emasculate the very purposes for which the Act was 
designed, i.e. to obtain immediate and necessary medical treatment 
together with the payment of compensation for periods of disability n 
and at the same time protect against dilatory or unjustified claims. 
Certainly an employer should not have to render medical treatment tc J 
employees at its peril merely because there is some uncertainty as t 
whether the cause for treatment be industrial or non-industrial in 
nature. As Chief Justice Wolfe concurring specially in Crow v. In~ 
trial Commission et. al. 104 Utah 333 at 338 stated: 
"The insurance carrier is not 'estopped' by its 
payment of compensation. It does not pay at the 
peril of admitting the extent or duration of the 
-10-
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s· 
:i 
ta·. 
.i 
disability. It is not estopped because the appli-
cant has not acted to his detriment in reliance on 
its action. Its action in paying compensation as 
if the disability were total for an indefinite 
period without requiring applicant to have it 
found by the commission as total is all for the 
applicant's benefit. To hold otherwise would 
discourage a practice highly beneficial to all 
parties." 
In view of the above we submit that in the light of the evidence 
tt and the record in this case, the estoppel position asserted in Res-
pondent's Brief is invalid and wholly untenable as applied to plain-
~ tiff's conduct or as applied to defendant's reliance upon such conduct 
lt co his detriment. 
CONCLUSION 
Jr It is the position of the plaintiff that the arguments set forth 
1~ in Respondent's Brief are invalid and untenable; the clear language of 
m· the statute (35-1-99), as interpreted in the unanimous decision of this 
Lnc court in the Gardner case, excludes medical treatment from considera-
Ln tion as payment of compensation within the application of the limita-
cion provisions of this statute. Plaintiff submits also that the 
t Industrial Commission's conclusion of law that the rendition of 
ty medical treatment constitutes "payment of compensation" within the 
:ns. language of the statute was erroneous and improper - erroneous because 
u it flies squarely in the face of the unanimous decision of the Court 
s t in the Gardner case and improper because it represents an effort on 
n che part of the Industrial Commission to rewrite or distort the 
~ statute by administrative fiat instead of observing the Court's advice 
ln Gardner (20 Utah 2d at 378) by " . leaving the matter of 
changing the language to the legislature if it chooses to liberalize, 
~larify or otherwise rewrite it." 
-11-
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Accordingly, we respectfully request this Court to reject 
Industrial Commission's attempt to rewrite the statute and to affirn 
and confirm the Court's prior interpretation of the limitation pro-
visions of §35-1-99 as set forth in the Gardner decision by setting cop~ 
aside as contrary to law the Industrial Commission's Order heretofor< pos 1 
entered in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this day of /flJt y , 1979 0 
7 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-12-
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